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- No Fault Found or NFF is not new.
- Strangely, no consensus exists as to it's causes or cures.
- Before ANY problem can be resolved it needs to be fully
understood.
- To understand it, we need to define some terms so we can
communicate.
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- NFF has many aliases.
- One person's NFF is another's CND.
- Every organization has it's pet name for it and associated
database
to track it.
- Some break it down into sub-categories, confusing the
issues even more.
- We need to get back to basics and call it what it really
is: INTERMITTENCY
.
- I2LM.
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- The Military, Space, Airlines and others with their
"systems in
motion" seem to be getting hit the hardest by NFF.
- The equipment is more integrated and complex.
- The environmental abuses are worse.
- The margin for error is less.
- The NFF monetary and political impact is greater.
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- In any well designed system, maintenance of that system is
engineered
into it, with some goal in mind.
- In aircraft systems the maintenance target is quick fixes.
- Diagnostics are geared to replacing suspect boxes quickly
with boxes
believed to be good.
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- By the "Law of Probabilities", engineers saw that pulling
the suspect box off the aircraft would usually fix the reported
defects,
since more system components are in the box than are left in the
aircraft.
- However, they never calculated how aging factors would
affect those
probabilities.
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- In the past few years, great strides have been made in
electronic component
reliability.
- Fewer components are being replaced.
- More connectivity type repairs such as soldering, cleaning
or inspecting
of wires, connectors, switches, sensors, etc.
- The failure mode of these connectivity elements is random
intermittency
that gets worse over time.
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- It's this "Random" factor that causes diagnostic chaos.
- You "can't fix it, iff'n it ain't broken".
- Is there really a problem or not?
- Did the technician pull the right box?
- Was the problem really in the aircraft wiring?
- Did the Pilot really know how to use the system?
- "Lets just call it NFF, we can't spend forever testing it.
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- After the spares pool is polluted with intermittent boxes,
NFF rates
rise rapidly.
- Operational Readiness suffers greatly.
- Avionics systems are replaced or upgraded.
- All new training and testing needed for these new systems.
- New aircraft replaces old.
- Cycle repeats.
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- Engineers have tried every diagnostic ploy imaginable
except one, Directly
testing for the problem.
- Some don't believe that intermittencies are even a problem.
- Never considered the "randomness" factor.
- Mistakenly "hoped" that ATE and other testers could detect
all intermittent events.
- They didn't do the math.
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- In comparing depot repairs:
- In one-stop, the final test is the unit functioning
properly.
- In multi-level, ATE determines if the unit is good.
- One-stop sees a lot of intermittence and little NFF.
- Multi-level sees little intermittence and a lot of NFF.
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- In "doing the math" the LRU's with the highest connection
counts, usually also have the highest NFF rates.
- Common sense tells us that if we have never properly tested
the connectivity
elements, then, over time, we may have created a niche for these latent
failures to accumulate.
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- We've looked at the many complex issues associated with
NFF, now lets
look for a way to simplify the solution.
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- Intermittents can be classified into one of three types.
- The key to solving NFF problems is to know which type of
intermittent
is responsible.
- After you define the problem correctly, it's much easier to
fix.
- Observe the clues:
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- Aging factors:
- When a system is new, you get more Engineering and
Test-void problems,
until all the "bugs" get worked out.
- Environmental stress factors, over time, cause connectivity
problems
to become much more prevalent..
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- Where and how?
- Engineering type intermittents are happening to all
the
units and usually during operation.
- Test voids are happening with a few units
and always
fail a test at the next higher level of testing due to failed components.
- Connectivity failures occur in a few units,
during
use, and can not be found at test.
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- Virtually all of our test equipment is geared towards
finding hard
failures only.
- Technical, engineering and support processes are devoted to
hard failures
only.
- Technicians who actually see and understand the problem are
given no
support or equipment to fix the problem.
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- Engineers design tests for new systems.
- Not familiar with connector science or aging problems.
- Mistakenly believe that ATE sees all intermittent problems.
- Don't understand the problem randomness plays in testing
for intermittents.
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- ATE can't "see" random intermittent problems due to:
- Fixed test windows.. Maybe the intermittent won't show up
this week.
- Scanning: Even if the intermittency is active ATE will
probably be
measuring the wrong pin at the right time.
- Filtering: ATE tries to eliminate the noise.
- No stress is applied.
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- Sample and Hold:
- Typical equipment for "Shake and Bake"
- Can have intermittencies up to tolerance level without
reporting any.
- Mistakenly apply statistical science, sampling methods in
belief something
will show up if enough samples are taken.
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- Think about this:
- To measure volts we use a VOLT-METER.
- To measure current we use an AMP-METER.
- To measure continuity we use a CONTINUITY tester.
- To measure random DIS-CONTINUITY we use everything but a
DIS-CONTINUITY
tester.
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- Some continuity testers have a fast scan mode that sends
digital signals
down groups of wires to increase throughput.
- After doing the math, you may find that the detection
capability is
still too low.
- Attenuation problems also arise when TTL signals are pushed
down long
lines.
- TTL not effective for ohmic intermittencies.
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- This chart shows graphically why the IFD-2000's neural
network technology
is superior overall in detecting intermittent failures.
- Note: Probability bar on IFD-2000 is actually 10 times
larger than
shown.
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- IFD-2000 is easy to setup and use.
- The only programming involved is in telling it what to
"SAY"
when an event occurs.
- Inexpensive, common, D-50 connectors are used on the
IFD-2000 interface.
- Simply add your connector to the other end.
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- A versatile instrument:
- The IFD-2000 can be used by technicians as a diagnostic
tool, on aircraft
or LRUs.
- Periodic inspections for prognostics and trending.
- After trending, repairs or mods can be done without further
testing.
- Produces print-outs and records to verify quality.
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- Diagnostic Workstation:
- Enhance ATE testing.
- Numerous 3rd party hardware and software add-ons integrate
easily.
- Generic
- Service numerous systems with the same equipment.
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- Where best to apply the IFD-2000?
- Worst systems first.
- For any given failure, both the Aircraft and the LRU each
contain nearly
equal numbers of possible NFF failure sites.
- While SRUs may have just as many sites or more, they are
thought to
be more reliable due to soldering
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- IFD-2000 Effectivity:
- 26 units were tested.
- 14 units had one or more intermittents.
- 12 units required recalibration only.
- ATE testing found intermittent problems in only 2 units.
- ATE NFF rate = 46%
- Simulator, after hours of testing found 8 units to have
latent failures.
- SIM. NFF rate = 15%
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- When "doing the math", to cost-justify intermittency
testing,
you have to look way beyond the repair shop budget to find the real
savings.
- You need to also consider what the "worst case" risks are
from not testing.
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- The "father" of quality control outlined the testing
philosophy
that has guided the United States Navy and the world for decades.
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- Considering the huge ATE costs, and that it is only finding
50% of
the problems, then:
- If it was necessary and cost effective to invest in ATE, in
the beginning,
then investing now in intermittency testing is a bargain.
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- You've looked at the problem.
- You've looked at the solution.
- Now, look at the costs,
- Consider the risks,
And then,
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Transportable
or
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